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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS:

HOW DISTRICT-LEVEL POLICE TRANSITION TEAMS CAN MAKE PROVINCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS MORE EFFECTIVE

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Executive Summary

Title: Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations: How District-Level Police Transition Teams Can Make Provincial Reconstruction Teams More Effective

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Thesis: A change in the structure and employment of the district-level police transition teams will make Provincial Reconstruction Team efforts more effective on the overall national stability in current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future civil-military operations.

Discussion: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Transition Teams (TTs) are scattered throughout the various provinces of Iraq and Afghanistan. They perform a myriad of missions to assist the host country to become more stable and self sufficient. As the requirement for additional PRTs continues to grow, the Department of State is struggling to find qualified personnel to fill positions within PRTs. In order to build on the successes achieved by ongoing transition efforts, the Department of Defense must restructure current police transition teams (PTTs) and employ them to support PRT endeavors at the district level. Restructuring of PTTs can alleviate some of the burden facing PRTs and act as a conduit between local and provincial government officials.

Conclusion: Current literature on stability operations examines PRTs and TTs as separate entities and provides lessons learned for each respective organization. However, there are no publications to date that examine the relationship between PRTs and TTs. The author argues that an efficient working relationship between PRTs and PTTs will effectively promote interaction between local and provincial government officials, thereby positively impacting the transition process. As personnel shortfalls continue to increase, Department of Defense and Department of State leaders must make better use of existing personnel to meet the transition challenges ahead. Restructuring the Police Transition Teams to work with PRTs provides an interim solution to the personnel shortfalls currently experienced by the Department of State. Police transition teams can provide that critical link between local and provincial governments and assist the PRTs in their reconstruction efforts. The employment of Police Transition Teams with PRT-like capabilities provides a viable solution for PRT personnel shortfalls and warrants further study.

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Preface

The following thesis is a result of the author's experience as Battery Commander, Provisional Military Police Company, Combat Logistics Regiment 15, Camp Al Taqaddum, Iraq from August 2006 to March 2007 and Police Transition Team Leader for the Al Qa'im Police District in Al Qa'im, Iraq from September 2007 to April 2008. These assignments have led to continued interest and study of current U.S. efforts in reconstruction and stability operations. This research would not have been possible without many subsequent discussions about transition team employment with other police transition team leaders; the Iraqi Security Forces Cell in Al Asad; the members of 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines; and several patriotic civilians who continue to do their part against global terrorism. This thesis represents a culmination of a year of learning that would not have been possible without LtCol Kelly P. Alexander, Dr. Paul D. Gelpi, and my mentor, Dr. Eric Shibuya.

Introduction

Nation-building is defined as "the use of armed forces in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy."¹ Seven years into the Global War on Terror and the United States continues to struggle with reconstruction and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are civil-military organizations designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities.² They were designed as a transitional structure to provide improved security and facilitate reconstruction and economic development.³ Another organization employed to take on post-conflict challenges are Police Transition Teams (PTTs). These military units have varying skill sets and assists the host country at all levels of government. They are task-organized to facilitate training and mentoring of local police personnel in functional areas such as operations, intelligence, communications, logistics, and leadership. Interestingly, there is very limited interaction between PTTs and PRTs in the transition process.

Both PRTs and PTTs have become crucial parts of stability and peacekeeping operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, PRTs, in both stability and peacekeeping operations, lack an overarching strategy, set of common objectives, and a common concept of operation and organizational structure.⁴ Even

more disconcerting, is the increasing shortfalls in staffing of PRTs. The author submits that the PTTs have the qualifications to fill this void. PRT and PTT interaction, will in turn, complete interagency coordination at all levels of government.

This is a qualitative study on the military's role in the transition phase between major combat operations and subsequent reconstruction and stability operations. The study will first examine the structure and employment of both the PRTs and TTs, and training requirements of each component. The study will argue that reorganizing the structure and employment of current Police Transition Teams (PTTs) will provide an interim solution to the personnel shortfalls of PRTs.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

In 2002, The Department of Defense, the Department of State and the USAID⁵ developed the concept of employing interagency civil-military field teams throughout Afghanistan in order to speed up reconstruction efforts. In 2004, the Coordinator for Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction was established to address consequent interagency challenges identified early on by these civil-military field teams, known as PRTs. The first PRT was established in the city of Gardez, south of the capital city of Kabul. In November 2005, ten PRTs were established in Iraq and located on U.S military bases. The Department of State was designated as the lead agency, but relied on the military for

security and logistical support.⁶ PRT structures varied in size, scope, and mission focus in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The PRTs were also modified to meet local security, political, and socio-economic dynamics in area of operations.⁷ However, this operational flexibility presented coordination problems between Department of Defense and Department of State employees and became a contentious issue for both departments.

The National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44), signed on December 7, 2005, was to provide U.S. government agencies the written guidelines for the management of interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization operations. Secretary of State Robert M. Gates further emphasized the importance of interagency efforts by stating:

Economic development, institution-building, and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more-these along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.⁸

To achieve this long-term success, Major General Bobby Wilkes, the Joint Staff's deputy director of politico-military affairs for Asia stated:

...the country needs to be able to build a civilian rapid-response capability...The lessons of Iraq, and Afghanistan as well, is that our nation will be well-served if there exists a surge capacity in the non-military skill sets that are so important in the kinds of conflicts we have been engaged in since the early 1990s.⁹

Hillary Clinton, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 13, 2009 after she was nominated to become Secretary of State, also stressed the imbalance between civilian and military resources as one of the key challenges facing the State Department. "If we don't enhance our diplomatic and development efforts and move towards more equilibrium, as Secretary Gates even has said, we will not be as successful as we need to be in promoting our foreign policy."¹⁰ However, PRT management continued to struggle to achieve unity of effort between participating agencies (see Appendix A.)¹¹

The US Agency for International Development (USAID), understanding the civilian-military imbalance in complex operations, established the Office of Military Affairs in the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance to address the shortage of personnel and increase collaboration between Department of State and Department of Defense.¹² In addition to the problems USAID faces, the Department of State, which was recently designated as the lead agency for PRT matters in Iraq,¹³ continues to struggle to identify and recruit qualified personnel to meet the increasing demand for PRTs. A preliminary report released by the National Defense University concerning the civilian capacity problem concluded that "the current efforts to build a civilian response capacity for complex operations are unfinished and that the Obama

administration needs to dedicate additional attention and resources to complete the task."¹⁴

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the Department of State provides a litany of essential tasks for PRTs to accomplish. The Essential Tasks List is considered a "living" document and is broken down into five major parts: Security, Governance and Participation, Humanitarian and Social Well-Being, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, and Justice and Reconciliation.¹⁵ Both the *PRT Playbook* and the *Reconstruction and Stabilization Essential Tasks* document provide Department of State personnel with role responsibilities and guidance concerning PRT stabilization and reconstruction activities.

According to Chapter 2 of the *PRT Handbook*,

The provincial reconstruction team (PRT) envisions an integrated civil-military organization expanding the reach of the U.S. government (USG) and wider international community assistance efforts from the environs of the capitol to the provincial level to the local community.¹⁶

The PRT Handbook further states that the PRT should focus on three elements of stabilization and reconstruction:

- a) Increase provincial stability through international military presence and assist in developing nascent host nation security and rule of law capacity.
- b) Facilitate reconstruction at a pace that begins to provide basic services, provide an economic system that supports the people, gain popular buy-in for change and support of representative government, and ensure popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated.

c) Assist the establishment and improvement of local government, including its connection to the central government and populace, by advising and empowering stakeholders and legitimate governing bodies, influencing "fence sitters," and countering obstructionists and spoilers.¹⁷

However, the document does not provide any guidance on establishing a working relationship with the military at the battalion and below level. The idea of a "whole of government approach" towards reconstruction and stabilization of a host country must go beyond provincial-level interaction and include local-level participation in order to be effective. For a majority of the local populace, the battlespace commander and the district level transition teams are their primary connection to the provincial and central government. Oftentimes, the battalion commander and the district-level transition team leaders are asked by local military and government officials to assist with passing information to higher levels of their government to emphasize the importance of their requests. PRT personnel must recognize these multiple lines of communication between the local government, local-level coalition partners, and transition teams, and make considerations to leverage these assets. PRT members must acknowledge the synergistic value battlespace commanders and transition teams can provide to facilitate the stability and reconstruction of a host country. Ignoring this untapped resource limits the overall

reconstruction and stabilization effort, thereby prolonging the transition process. The military has been conducting counterinsurgency operations for decades and has a good understanding of the transition process. The local area battalion commander should not have to solicit PRT recognition of the military capabilities available at the local level. The USG must recognize that interagency coordination has to occur at all levels of government in order for reconstruction and stabilization operations to be successful.

Transition Teams

The experiences of the U.S. Marines in counterinsurgency operations in Haiti (1915-1934), Santo Domingo (1916-1922), and Nicaragua (1926-1933) during the Banana Wars resulted in the publication of the Marine Corps' *Small Wars Manual* in 1940. The manual states that,

The difficulty is sometimes of an economical, political, or social nature and not a military problem in origin...The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political or social.¹⁸

The transition from direct military action against the enemy to indirect military support of indigenous forces to create long term stability was further developed during the conflict in Vietnam. The structure of transition teams currently deployed in

Iraq and Afghanistan is based on the structure of the U.S. Marine squads in the Combined Action Companies during Vietnam.

The Combined Action Program (CAP) provides the foundation from which organizational and employment structure of the current transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan have evolved. The first Combined Action Company (CACO) was deployed by 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines on 03 August 1965 around the Phu Bai airstrip.¹⁹ The Marines recognized the value of the Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) in defeating the enemy within their tactical area of responsibility and sought to formalize cooperation between Marine patrols and PFs. What began as an ad-hoc relationship born out of necessity, resulted in integrated efforts to provide village security, PF military training, intelligence gathering, psychological operations against the enemy, and civic actions.

The Combined Action Platoon (also known as CAP) consisted of a 14-man Marine rifle squad with a U.S. Navy Corpsman and the standard Popular Forces Platoon of approximately 35 Vietnamese soldiers (see Appendix B).²⁰ The CAP Organization established parallel chains of command and theoretically placed the military leader and his Vietnamese counterpart as having equal duties at each level of the structure. The responsibilities of Combined Action Group (CAG) and the CACO were comparable to those of current Regimental Combat Teams and battalion-size Task Forces,

respectively. The mere presence of U. S. Marines working alongside PF soldiers gave villagers a sense of security and normalcy. In return for their security, the Marines were able to act on information provided by the villagers concerning Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army activity in the area. Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, visited many Combined Action Units during the Vietnam War and stated,

The Vietcong had enjoyed a free ride in the Vietnamese hamlets because of the general incompetence of the Popular Forces and the consequent uncertainty of the people. The Combined Action idea was an effective answer to the problem, helping to free people to act, speak, and live without fear. It was a multiplier, where the final product had combatant value many times the sum of its individual components.²¹

This idea of working closely with the local security forces to gain the trust and cooperation of the local citizens in order to defeat insurgent activities has been quite successful. Unlike the CAP in Vietnam, which had isolated Marine squads in villages and hamlets working almost exclusively with PF soldiers, current transition teams are primarily sourced by the Army and the Marine Corps and structured to work with specific organizations within a particular area at each level of government.

For example, a transition team could be tasked with duty at a particular port of entry leading into Iraq. The Port of Entry Transition Team would work closely with the Iraqi Ministry of

the Interior's Department of Border Enforcement and assist them with duties similar to those of the U. S. Customs and Immigration Service. In October 2006, Colonel Jadick, representative of the national-level Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) stated,

...transition teams are embedded with Iraqi Army units, the Department of Border Enforcement, the National Police...local Iraqi Police, and various other organizations to include the Joint Headquarters, Ministries of Interior and Defense, and miscellaneous training centers and schools...Currently, the IAG has administrative control of all externally sourced Military Transition Teams (MiTTs), Border Transition Teams (BTTs), and National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs)...²²

The difference at the local level is the command/support relationship between the transition teams and the battlespace commander. All the transition teams within a particular area of operation coordinate with the battalion for administrative and logistical support even though they do not report directly to the battalion commander. Operationally, the MiTTs and police transition team (PTTs) are partnered more closely than other transition teams with the battalion commander because of day-to-day interactions with local military and police leaders. The continuing decline of violence in various provinces in Iraq since 2007 has allowed Coalition Forces to focus transition team efforts on the development of the Iraqi Police, especially in the Al Anbar Province.

As of January 2008, Al Anbar Province, Iraq had approximately 19 Army and Marine PTTs training, mentoring, and advising their Iraqi Police (IP) counterparts. The author personally deployed as the District level PTT Leader to the city of Al Qa'im, Iraq from September 2007 to April 2008. In addition to mission tasks from the Regimental Combat Team in Al Asad and the resident battalion for the Al Qa'im Area of Operations, the District PTT was also responsible for and provided direction to an Army National Guard Military Police Company working at the station level. Throughout the deployment, PTT members and their local police counterparts met with local government officials on a regular basis to identify problem areas within their respective jurisdiction and implement necessary corrective measures. PTT members had to be well versed in a variety of subjects such as Iraqi Rule of Law, Tribal Law, the local economy, and health and education. An article in the Marine Corps Gazette best summarizes the significance of a professional police force:

The IP are inextricably linked to these pivotal urban centers because their forces are largely composed of locals with close tribal affiliations to key sheiks, city council members, and their citizenry. A professional IP force, legitimate in the eyes of those it is built to protect and serve, ultimately assists local governments and judiciaries in gaining self-sufficiency and influence.²³

As with other battlespace owners in the Al-Anbar province, the battalion commander for Al Qa'im recognized the need to develop

the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces in that area. Transition team tasks became the main focus of effort and were integrated into the daily operations of the battalion. These tasks, in turn, were synchronized with local government officials in weekly joint coordination meetings. Transition team leaders along with their Iraqi counterparts would meet with the regional mayor, other government officials, and local sheiks to discuss problems and possible solution relating to security, governance, rule of law, and other matters affecting the area. Unfortunately, these meetings did not have any PRT representation.

Issues and concerns with Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The Provincial Reconstruction Team concept has the potential to become a successful model for future reconstruction and stabilization operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. But as Michael J. McNerney points out about the PRTs in Afghanistan,

Despite their potential and record of success, however, PRTs always have been a bit of a muddle. Inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation, and, most important, limited resources have confused potential partners and prevented PRTs from having greater effect on Afghanistan's future.²⁴

This view is supported by Major Shakib Rahimzy, a former Afghan National Army officer and current Afghan National Police officer who has served in the Ministry of Interior and worked extensively with various Coalition PRTs across Afghanistan. He

states local perceptions are that a majority of the PRTs have a shortage of personnel, lack cultural understanding of the area, and do not provide much needed vocational, technical, and agricultural expertise. More importantly, the PRTs do not effectively coordinate with other PRTs within the region.²⁵ At the strategic level, U.S.-led PRTs do not necessarily engage with Coalition or NATO-led PRTs and at the operational and tactical level, U.S.-led PRTs often do not coordinate efforts between themselves. The lack of coordination at higher levels of government only adds to the frustrations of many village elders and local government officials who are trying to regain some semblance of normalcy in their lives. Many citizens who live in remote mountainous areas perceive the Afghan government as incapable of providing basic human needs and security for its citizens as stated in the Afghanistan Compact of 2006.²⁶

Major Rahimzy also stated that some PRTs do not coordinate with media personnel to provide local governments transparency on their reconstruction efforts, nor do PRT members meet with political party members, and educational and agricultural leaders at the district and local levels. For many local citizens who view some provincial-level government officials as lazy, less than trustworthy, or perhaps even corrupt, the lack of connection at lower levels have damaging effects on the fragile reputation of the PRTs.²⁷

Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Bourne was on the first USMC Embedded Training Team in Afghanistan in 2003 and worked with the PRTs as they were getting established in the southern part of the country. He later commanded a Task Force in Iraq which replaced the equivalent of six battalions and has worked extensively with PRTs and embedded PRTs (PRTs co-located with battalions). According to LtCol Bourne, both entities are assets that provide depth to ongoing transition efforts and are worth synchronizing and supporting. He pointed out that command relationship structure in his area of operations was the largest obstacle. The embedded PRT did not work for the PRT and both entities had direct but separate lines of communications to the Chief of Mission. This made for coordinated solutions in the Province difficult to achieve.²⁸

The researcher sent out a questionnaire to several commanders who have served throughout Iraq and Afghanistan at different levels of government during the reconstruction and stabilization process. The researcher found that responses about PRT effectiveness varied depending on the battlespace owner's proximity to a PRT.²⁹ The battalion commanders located near a PRT echo the comments made by LtCol Bourne. However, other battalion commanders who were located far from the provincial government headquarters had little to no interaction with PRTs and did not view PRT efforts in a positive light. Marshall Adame, a retired

U.S. Marine Vietnam veteran who has served on a PRT staff in Baghdad in 2005 stated,

The full potential and dynamics that could have been manifested throughout Iraq as a result of the PRT, as it was initially intended to operate, will never be known or appreciated... Any increase in troop strength or even doubling the size of the PRTs, without a plan to empower the Department of State diplomats, adjust or restructure their current operating plan, or to modify engagement rules for our soldiers and include Iraqi participation into the operations, is an act of futility cloaked in what appears to be desperation.³⁰

This is not to say that the Department of State is not trying to address this issue. John E. Herbst, Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), in front of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations stated,

My office is charged with two tasks. The first is to ensure that the entire U.S. Government is organized to deal with reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) crises affecting U.S. national interests, to include harmonizing civilians and military activities. The second and equally important task is to build the civilian capacity to staff these missions when called upon to respond...We have reached interagency agreement for how the U.S. Government should organize itself to deal with stabilization crisis...³¹

The new approach, called the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization was designed to provide coordinated interagency policy and program management for complex crises and consists of three elements:

a) the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), which is managed by the National Security Council and has a full time staff to collect all interagency interactions and integrate them; b) the Integration

Planning Cell, which is a civilian planning cell that deploys to Geographic Combatant Command or multinational headquarters to harmonize civilian and military planning, processes, and operations; and c) the Advanced Civilian Team (ACT), a rapid response team that deploys to the field to assist the Chief of Mission in implementing the U.S. R&S strategic plan and if necessary, deploys Field Advance Civilian Teams to provide maximum capacity to implement R&S programs at the provincial or local level similar to PRTs.³²

The National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44), the S/CRS, and the IMS are supposed to address the multitude of problems associated with civil-military coordination at all levels of the host government in the post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Interestingly, the IMS is not being used in Afghanistan. To complicate matters further, the S/CRS does not have the lead or oversight over the Afghanistan Steering Group (ASG) or the Afghan Interagency Operations Group (ASIOG) even though both the ASG and the ASIOG have similar functions to the CRSG.³³ For local-level Afghan government, the Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group (ICMAG) performs many of the functions that an ACT would perform in Iraq.³⁴ Regardless of whether coordination is done by the ICMAG in Afghanistan or the ACT in Iraq, the fundamental problem has yet to be adequately addressed. How can the U.S. government provide PRT capabilities at the lowest level of government when the Department of State continues to struggle with recruiting personnel for the PRT mission?

The *PRT Playbook* states:

The integration and alignment of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful stability and reconstruction operations. PRTs must focus on supporting the host nation's government (local and national) and the populace across the stabilization and reconstruction sectors...Political, social, and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian organizations and expertise. However, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks.³⁵

The Center for Army Lessons Learned recognizes that the concept of nation-building requires cooperation between agencies to effectively implement these programs at all levels with the host government, regardless whether civilian, military or both.

Selection Criteria, Training Requirements, and Structure Change

In order to accomplish the PRT tasks necessary for the host government to become successful several actions must occur with regard to the PRT-PTT relationship. Both U.S. Departments of State and Defense must recognize that the district PTT is the best qualified transition team to act as an extension of the PRT and assist local level government officials communicate with their counterparts at provincial and national levels. The primary reason for this assertion is because a district chief of police duties requires interaction with other government officials to coordinate events that involve police presence. The PTT are often present during many of these interactions, have an operational knowledge of tribal influences on various businesses

working within the city, and possess an understanding of the personalities of the government officials. These interactions greatly enhance the PRT's first requirement to gain access to local power centers and assess the environment to determine the issues that need to be addressed, and the challenges and obstacles impacting them.³⁶ The *PRT Playbook* submits that the stability of the local area in relation to the spectrum of intervention,³⁷ determines the amount of interaction a PRT will be able to perform. Regardless of the PRT's proximity to the PTTs and the local governments they support, established lines of communication will ensure coordinated efforts between the PRT and the PTTs (See Appendix C).

Second, guidelines must be established by both Departments of State and Defense for selecting individuals for duty on PRTs and PTTs, and employing those individuals in the appropriate billet. A recent report by Barber and Parker on Iraq PRTs found that,

...a large majority of team leaders expressed frustration in getting staff with needed skills...Some individuals, despite significant time on the job, have trouble defining their jobs or explaining the overall team and provincial dynamics. This problem can be greatly exacerbated by weak team leadership and staff largely left to ascertain their jobs on their own absent specific guidance or clearly defined roles...there were a range of stories about PRT members not knowing their duties until they started the job, or discovering upon arrival that their role had changed entirely—not necessarily related to their skill sets.³⁸

The military services have encountered similar issues regarding the selection of qualified individuals for transition teams. To minimize such situations from occurring, civilian and military leaders must take into consideration the personalities and the qualifications of their employees before assigning them to PRT or PTT positions. Dr. Thomas D. Affourtit stated:

In order to develop cross-cultural expertise, the advisor must understand himself, and himself in relation to his counterpart. A better understanding of this interpersonal relationship will reduce the time to build rapport, establish trust and confidence, and gain the insight necessary to promote adaptation.³⁹

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance emphasizes that "In order to influence the behavior of their counterparts, advisors must either possess or receive training on the requisite interpersonal skills required to be effective and to facilitate counterpart satisfaction."⁴⁰

Third, interagency training must occur. Currently, training for Department of State personnel assigned to PRTs consist of a 5-day Foreign Affairs Counter Threat Course and a 5-day Iraq or Afghan PRT Orientation Course at the Foreign Service Institute.⁴¹ Training for U.S. Army soldiers assigned to transition teams take place at Fort Riley, Kansas and The Advisor Training Group in Twenty Nine Palms, California currently trains all Marine transition teams prior to deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.⁴² The 18-day course for Marines consists of first aid/medical

skills training, cultural advisor training, language training, staff planning, and foreign weapons training. The course culminates with a 4-day practical application exercise that takes place in a town complete with a mosque and up to 100 Arabic speaking civilians playing a variety of roles.

The training requirements for both Departments of State and Defense personnel seem to compliment one another and address the need to develop interpersonal relationship with host nation counterparts. However, none of the training sufficiently addresses building interpersonal relationship between PRT civilian personnel and their military counterparts. Ideally, PRT and PTT personnel should train together prior to arrival at their destination. This will allow both teams to understand one another's expectations, capabilities, and deficiencies. If the entire team cannot participate in the training, team leaders must have the opportunity to meet one another. Lack of training between the teams could easily create a working environment that disrupts reciprocal communication between the PRT and prominent people at the district and local levels.

Lastly, structural changes must be made to the district PTT Table of Organization. Sourcing of District PTTs must be deliberate and well planned. The District PTT must comprise of Marines that have experience and knowledge in the areas comparable to those of the PRT members. This will allow the

Marine with a particular skill set, such as budgeting, to easily articulate issues and concerns with both the PRT budgeting officer (who may be located miles away) and the local budgeting official. The District PTT must also have several higher ranking, older individuals than what is currently allotted. A majority of host government officials are anywhere from 40 to 60 years old. By virtue of their age, many of the younger Marines lack the clout to garner respect and influence with local government officials. In order to be perceived as legitimate partners by the local officials, The U.S. government must make the effort to establish near peer-to-peer relationships with local officials.


Conclusion

The Department of State continues to build civilian capacity in response to increase demand for PRT presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of Defense continues to look toward the Department of State and non-governmental agencies to provide the political, social, and economic expertise necessary to stabilize both countries to allow for withdrawal of a majority of its troops. An efficient working relationship between PRTs and PTTs will effectively promote interaction between local and provincial government officials, thereby positively impacting the transition process. The S/CRS has stated, "Building civilian capacity for reconstruction and

stabilization is essential to our national security and I have no doubt that the U. S. Government will have this capability in the next ten years."⁴³ Until that capacity is reached, Department of Defense and Department of State leaders must make better use of their personnel or be more efficient in coordinating their efforts to meet the transition challenges ahead. PTTs are trained with the necessary skill sets to assist the PRTs in their endeavors.

As President Obama and his administration shift military forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, it is imperative to strengthen interagency efforts across the entire spectrum of the transition process. Selecting, training, and employing the PTTs in a manner that facilitates PRTs efforts can provide that critical link between local and provincial governments and assist the PRTs in their reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lester Grau, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and Research Director for the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas believes a vital area to success in stability operations is at the district level. He comments, "We are about to make significant increase in the size of the force in Afghanistan... this might be a good short-term solution to get some folks into critical areas."⁴⁴ Police Transition Teams with PRT-like capabilities provides a viable short-term solution for PRT personnel shortfalls.


Appendix A



Lines of Management

Source: Center for Army Lessons Learned, *PRT Playbook*.
September 2007, No. 07-34. 28.


Appendix B



CAP Organization

Source: Michael P. Peterson, *The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 137.

Appendix C



Proposed Lines of Coordination Between Coalition Forces and Host Government

Source: Created by Author.

Appendix D

List of Acronyms

ACT - Advanced Civilian Team

ASG - Afghanistan Steering Group

ASIOG - Afghan Interagency Operations Group

BTT - Border Transition Teams

CACO - Combined Action Company

CAG - Combined Action Group

CAP - Combined Action Program / Combined Action Platoon

CRSG - Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group

IAG - Iraq Assistance Group

ICMAG - Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group

IMS - Interagency Management System

IP - Iraqi Police

LtCol - Lieutenant Colonel

MiTT - Military Transition Teams

NPTT - National Police Transition Teams

PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PTT - Police Transition Teams

PF - Popular Forces

R&S - Reconstruction and Stabilization

S/CRS - Coordinator for the Office of R & S

USAID - US Agency for International Development

USG - U.S. Government

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